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COLLOQUY
RELIGION AND RACE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION: SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES
Jesse H. Choper4
There is a morally compelling and constitutionally powerful tradi-
tion in the United States against treating people differently because of
either their race or their religious beliefs. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has employed criteria under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment for reviewing government action dealing with religion in
an approach that varies considerably from the one it has used for race
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
The object of this Article, which focuses on the purpose and the effect of
state regulations that either favor or prejudice persons or groups on ac-
count of race or religion, is mainly to outline an analysis of the Reli-
gion Clauses, and secondarily to contrast that analysis with the
doctrines that the Court has developed under the Equal Protection
Clause.
I
PURPOSE
A. Intentional Prejudice
1. Similarities Between Race and Religion
There is a powerful resemblance between the government sin-
gling out persons for imposition of adverse consequences because of
their skin color 3 and because of or their ideological beliefs. This like-
ness calls for analogous handling under the Constitution. Perhaps the
strongest justification for strictjudicial scrutiny of any official attempt
to accord persons less than equal respect and dignity either because of
their religious beliefs or race rests in the fact that throughout history
t Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt
Hall). An abbreviated version of this article was delivered as the Robert S. Stevens Lecture,
Cornell Law School, September 8, 1993. I wish to thank Robert Holland of the Boalt Hall
class of 1993 for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 U.S. CowsT. amend I.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
3 Throughout this article, I include ethnicity within the same protected category as
race.
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such efforts have been similarly rooted in "hate, prejudice, vengeance,
[and] hostility."4 Although race may seem to be a more immutable
condition than religion,5 and religious belief systems may appear to
have a more interwoven effect than race on the conduct of people's
lives, both traits have been the object of public (and private) stereo-
typing, stigma, subordination and persecution in strikingly similar
ways.
In response, the Court has properly viewed both racial and reli-
gious discriminations with particular suspicion,6 and demanded "that
they be justified in terms of a significantly more pressing governmental
objective than normally required, and a near perfect fit between the
characterizations employed and the objective pursued."7 This method
is a "way of uncovering official attempts to inflict inequality for its own
sake-to treat a group worse not in the service of some overriding so-
cial goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its mem-
bers," a course of conduct based on assumptions of the "differential
worth"9 of religious and racial groups including judgments of their
odiousness or inferiority. Because it is extremely difficult for these
4 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L.
REv. 341, 358 (1949).
5 For a discussion of the immutability of religious beliefs, see Timothy L. Hall, Reli-
gion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1992).
6 In New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976), the Court unanimously catego-
rized religion along with race as being "suspect" classifications.
7 Hall, supra, note 5, at 55. The few decisions of the Supreme Court that have in-
volved deliberate disfavoring of persons or groups because of religious beliefs they do or do
not hold have employed the test of strict scrutiny, either expressly or implicitly, to invalidate
the regulations. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993)
(holding that a state may not forbid ritual animal sacrifice); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978) (holding that a state may not disqualify members of clergy from being legislators);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), reh'g denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982) (holding that a
state may not impose registration and reporting requirements only upon religious organiza-
tions that solicit more than half their funds from nonmembers); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that a state may not require notaries public to take oath of belief
in God). The one possible exception, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), did not
acknowledge as being discriminatory the Selective Service Act provision that exempted
from the draft individuals who were religiously opposed to "war in any form" but did not
excuse those who were religiously opposed only to "unjust wars." Id. In any event, the
Court's reasoning in Gillette is not necessarily inconsistent with its usual approach to the
problem. SeeJesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and An Appraisal
of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943, 960 (1986).
8 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DimusTR 153 (1980).
9 Paul Brest, Forward to In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle 90 HARv. L. Ray. 1,
7 (1976).
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stringent criteria to be met either factually' ° or legally,' very few classi-
fications that intentionally prejudice persons because of their race or
religion have been or will be upheld.12
It is useful to note the peculiar nature of the personal quality or
characteristic that is the subject of the special judicial protection
against deliberately disadvantaging people because of their religious
principles. At issue are beliefs or membership in a group that shares a
set of beliefs, rather than participation in some course of generally
regulated conduct. This concerns an ideal that extends beyond the
value of religious liberty, one that is deeply ingrained in several consti-
tutional provisions apart from the Religion Clauses. Thus, the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association have frequently been
used to protect a broad range of ideological convictions including reli-
gion,13 and would be applicable here as well.
2. Judicial Scrutiny of the Motives of Lawmakers
The intentional prejudice category plainly includes government
regulations that discriminate on their face. This category also con-
demns more subtle forms of state action which, by their explicit lan-
guage, may appear to accomplish a constitutionally permissible end,
but whose real aim is to disadvantage persons because they are mem-
bers of a certain race or because they hold or do not hold certain reli-
gious convictions. This requires the Court to ascertain whether the
lawmaking body intended to achieve a goal through the effect of the
regulation that is not plainly prescribed by its words.
Despite "the general rule that legislative motive or purpose is not
a relevant inquiry in determining the constitutionality of a statute,"' 4
the Court's approach both to the Religion Clauses and to racial dis-
crimination under the Equal Protection Clause has made legislative
10 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) and Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding military orders for exclusion and curfew ofJapanese-
Americans on the West Coast during World War II); cf Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333,
334 (1968) (Black, Harlan & Stewart, i., concurring) (discussing possibility of temporary
racial segregation in prison in response to racial tensions that threaten prison security).
11 The Court has ruled that government action preferring racial minorities and disfa-
voring the racial majority may be permissible, e.g., to remedy past discrimination in viola-
tion of statute or the Equal Protection Clause. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989); Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
12 Query as to the validity of requiring immunization of all members of a racial or
religious group that seems peculiarly susceptible to a particular illness such as sickle cell
anemia or Tay Sachs disease.
13 SeeJesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the Frst Amendmen, 1982 U. IuL. L. REv.
579, 581-83 (also suggesting the "fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine"
as a source for protecting against "government action that deliberately singles out one or
more religious groups for adverse treatment or that penalizes or withholds benefits from
persons because of their peculiar sectarian beliefs").
14 McDanie4 435 U.S. at 636 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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and administrative motivation a major criterion.15 Still, there is broad
agreement, reaching back to the landmark ruling in Fletcher v. Peck,' 6
that divining the real motives of lawmakers "is a perilous enterprise"' 7
and "a notoriously tricky affair."' 8 Thus, it is important to emphasize
several factors that limit the scope of this judicial inquiry regarding
lawmaking that is alleged to deliberately disadvantage people because
of either their race or religion.
First, there is a substantial "distinction between those things a leg-
islator hopes to accomplish by the operation of the statute for which he is
voting, and those things he hopes personally to achieve by the act of his
vote."'19 For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard,20 the Court had before it
a Louisiana statute that forbade "the teaching of the theory of evolu-
tion in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in 'creation
science.' "21 The former category of "hopes" includes the question of
whether a state legislator "voted for the Act... because he wanted to
foster religion or because he wanted to improve education."22 In con-
trast, the kinds of "hopes" described at length by Justice Scalia in Ed-
wards fall more readily into the latter category:
[A legislator] may have thought the bill would provide jobs for his
district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction of his
party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a close
friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he
owed the majority leader, or he may have hoped the Governor
would appreciate his vote and make a fundraising appearance for
him, or he may have been pressured to vote for a bill he disliked by a
wealthy contributor or by a flood of constituent mail, or he may have
been seeking favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctant to
hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or
he may have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed
the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife who opposed the bill,
.. . or, of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a
combination of some of the above and many other motivations.2 3
15 See id. ("cases under the Religion Clauses have uniformly held such an inquiry [into
legislative motive or purpose] necessary"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)
("basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose").
16 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
17 Thomas A. Schweitzer, Lee v. Weisman and the Establishment Clause: Are Invocations
and Benedictions at Public School Graduation Constitutionally Unspeakable?, 69 U. DEr. MERCY L.
REv. 113, 192 (1992).
18 Hall, supra note 5, at 65.
19 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1218 (1970) (discussing Ira Michael Heyman, The ChiefJustice, Racial Segregation,
and the Friendly Critics, 49 CAUF. L. REv. 104 (1961)).
20 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
21 Id. at 581.
22 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 Id.
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Admittedly, there is only a difference of degree rather than kind
"between those things a person intends to result immediately from his
act [the former category], and other more distant and less certain, but
nonetheless intended, results [the latter category]. 24 Moreover, resolv-
ing even questions in the former category "demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able. '25 But it appears to be within the judiciary's capacity to reach a
decision about the former category with adequate certainty; exploring
motivations in the latter category, however, seems to be "almost always
an impossible task."26
Second, the process of examining an intention to disadvantage a
racial or religious minority is to uncover only whether the government
action is meant to implement unspoken antagonism toward such a mi-
nority. This judicial inquiry is quite narrow and vastly different from
asking whether the legislators' purpose was in some oblique fashion to
"advance" a religious or racial cause when promulgating a regulation
that is religiously and racially neutral in both its language and adminis-
tration. It is one thing to question whether a lawmaking, body acted
with racial or religious animus, such as, whether "an admittedly imper-
missible motive has poisoned the political process." 27 It is quite an-
other to determine whether the purpose of a law that has concededly
been enacted to serve permissible public welfare goals was in some
part attributable to the racial or religious background, aspirations, ide-
ologies or beliefs of members of the legislature.
Religious motivations of this type are especially hard to isolate
because:
Beginning with the Founding itself, the history of the United States
reveals an inseparable connection between religion, morality, and
law. Many of our laws, even our basic system of constitutional gov-
ernment and individual rights, rest to a significant degree on reli-
gious understandings of the world, of human beings, and of social
relationships.28
Furthermore, individuals and groups often support a wide variety of
political, social and economic policies because of their religious ide-
als. 29 If the "real" purpose of programs of this kind was a ground for
24 Ely, supra note 19, at 1219.
25 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
26 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27 Hall, supra, note 5, at 66.
28 Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. LJ.
1, 6-7 (1991).
29 Timothy Hall has noted religion's potential to influence social policies:
Welfare programs may be supported for religious reasons relating to per-
ceived obligations to the poor. Statutes restricting the availability of abor-
tions may be supported by individuals who believe that abortion violates
19941
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judicial invalidation, then laws against homicide and theft would be
constitutionally vulnerable under the Religion Clauses.30 Because
"religious beliefs and values may permeate a person's world view by
underlying, reinforcing, and interacting with other 'secular' convic-
tions,"3 ' many legislators themselves would find it impossible to
"fathom their reactions to cross-currents of psychic stimuli"3 2 so as to
distinguish between which of their social views have a worldly basis and
which have deep religious roots. The problems forjudges in unscram-
bling the multiple purposes and unconscious motivations of legislators
in this context are greatly exacerbated when compared to those in-
volved in the surgically precise determination of whether there was a
specific legislative intention to disadvantage a racial or religious group.
a. Examples
Experience indicates that this confined inquiry into the motiva-
tions of lawmakers has been a manageable task for the federal courts.
Fortunately, intentional religious or racial discrimination occurs only
infrequently, and when it does, its suspicious appearance will ordina-
rily be fairly clear, even if wrapped "in the verbal cellophane"33 of legit-
imacy. A few examples enforcing the racial equality precept of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments should help demonstrate the
usual ease by which the judiciary may state the obvious to smoke out
illicit purposes of the overwhelming percentage of legislators. In
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,3 4 the Court held that the gerrymandering of Tus-
kegee, Alabama, which altered the city's shape "from a square to an
uncouth twenty-eight sided figure,"35 was unconstitutional because it
could have no purpose other than the disenfranchisement of blacks in
municipal elections.3 6 The Court found it "difficult to appreciate what
stands in the way of adjudging a statute having this inevitable effect
God's law. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed with substantial support
from religious believers who supported the Act, in part, on religious
grounds.
Hall, supra note 5, at 68. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICrIONS AND PoLr-
ICAL CHOICE (1988).
30 See Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular: Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 TEx. L. REv. 955, 998 (1989).
31 Schweitzer, supra note 17, at 195.
32 Gary Leedes, Taking the Bible Seriously, 1987 Am. B. FouND. REs. J. 311, 315.
33 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
35 Id. at 340.
36 Id.
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invalid."37 A similar case, Guinn v. United States,38 dramatically illus-
trates that some instances of inevitable effect "may for all practical pur-
poses demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various
circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonra-
cial grounds."3 9 Guinn invalidated Oklahoma's literacy test for voting
because its "grandfather clause" effectively exempted whites.40
Oklahoma then immediately enacted a new rule providing that all per-
sons who had previously voted were qualified for life but that all others
must register within a twelve day period or be permanently disen-
franchised.41 In Lane v. Wilson,42 the Court rejected the new
Oklahoma rule on the ground that the Fifteenth Amendment "nulli-
fies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."43
Until recently, there were no cases in which the Supreme Court
found it necessary to examine legislative motive in order to secure reli-
gious liberty against willfully prejudicial government regulations. But
this changed with the 1993 decision of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
v. Hialeah,44 which invalidated ordinances that barred ritual animal
sacrifice. The Court agreed that the words of the regulations were
"consistent with the claim of facial discrimination."45 However, be-
cause the language was "not conclusive," 46 the Court found that "[t] he
[legislative] record.., compels the conclusion that suppression of...
[religious] worship service was the object of the ordinances."47 No
member of the Court dissented from the following judgment:
The pattern... discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their
religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target this reli-
gious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with
care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost
all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much more reli-
37 Id. at 342. Alexander Bickel observed that:
Fanciful suggestions might have been possible, and they might have in-
cluded whim; but they would all have been disingenuous on their face given
the meticulous care with which, running the line house-by-house, the legisla-
ture succeeded in [removing all but four or five of the municipality's black
voters while] not eliminating a single previous white resident of Tuskegee
from the new city limits.
ALEXANDER M. BicaKL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 211 (1962).
38 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
39 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
43 Id. at 275.
44 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
45 Id. at 2227.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 2231.
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gious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate
ends asserted in their defense. 48
Moreover, there has been a series of church-state rulings, involv-
ing government programs to favor religion, which further demon-
strates that finding a law's "pre-eminent purpose,"49 as required in
order to identify deliberate disfavor, is a relatively straightforward task.
In Epperson v. Arkansas,50 invalidating a statute prohibiting the teaching
of evolution in public schools, the Court concluded that "Arkansas' law
selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it pros-
cribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular
religious doctrine."51 Citing newspaper advertisements and letters sup-
porting adoption of the statute in 1938, the Court found it "clear that
fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for
existence. '52 Similarly, in Torcaso v. Watkins,53 the Court observed that
there could be "no dispute about the [religious] purpose" 54 of a re-
quirement that public officeholders declare a belief in God.55 And in
Engel v. Vitale,56 the Court had "no doubt that ... daily classroom invo-
cation of... the Regents' prayer is a religious activity."57 This conclu-
sion was greatly bolstered by the Regents' Statement on Moral and
Spiritual Training in the Schools which proclaimed the prayer's goal
to be "teaching our children.., that Almighty God is their Creator,
and that by Him they have been endowed with their inalienable
rights."5 8
In other cases invalidating religious influences in the public
schools, the Court has drawn on common understanding to impeach
what it concluded were obviously implausible assertions that there
were nonreligious purposes for the challenged practices. In Abington
School District v. Schempp,59 the school boards contended that the read-
ing, without comment, of a chapter of the Bible at the opening of the
school day served such nonsectarian ends as promoting moral values,
contradicting the materialistic trends of the times, and teaching litera-
ture. The Court's brusque reply was that " [s]urely the place of the Bi-
ble as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid." 60 Similarly, in
48 Id. at 2231.
49 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
50 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
51 Id. at 103.
52 Id. at 107-08.
53 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
54 Id. at 489.
55 Id.
56 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
57 Id. at 424.
58 Record at 28, Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
59 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
60 Id. at 224.
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Stone v. Graham,61 the Court summarily reversed a decision of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court which had upheld the practice of posting copies
of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. 62 The
avowed purpose for the state program was printed at the bottom of
each copy: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is
clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western
Civilization and the Common Law of the United States."6 3 Observing
that the Commandments were not integrated into any study of history,
ethics or comparative religion, but could only have the effect, if any, of
inducing students to meditate on, revere, or perhaps obey them, the
Court concluded that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sa-
cred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recita-
tion of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact."64 In the
late 1950s, when a New York school board similarly required that a
"neutral version" of the Ten Commandments be placed in all class-
rooms, it was not so disingenuous as the Kentucky legislature. The
New York school board's announced purpose "to strengthen the moral
and spiritual values of the students in the school district,"65 was struck
down.66 Finally, in Wallace v. Jaffree,67 an Alabama statute, authorizing
a moment of silence in all public schools "for meditation," was
amended to read "for meditation or voluntary prayer. ' 68 The only
conceivable purpose for the changed language was to clarify the intent
that the period be used for prayer. No state witnesses suggested other-
wise, and the amendment's prime legislative sponsor acknowledged
the aim of returning prayer to public schools. 69
b. Procedures
The Supreme Court, aided by perceptive commentators, 70 has de-
veloped an approach for ascertaining invidious purpose in the area of
race.71 It has been less clear on a detailed method for determining
similar motives in the area of religion. However, the parallels between
61 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 41.
64 Id.
65 RobertJ. Coan, Comment, Bible Reading In the Public Schools, 22 AL. L. REv. 156, 156
(1958).
66 Id. at 157 n.4.
67 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
68 Id. at 40.
69 Id. at 56-57 & n.43.
70 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
71 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
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race and religion outlined here strongly suggest that the same system
be employed.
Articulation of a specific set of rules on the subject is beyond the
scope of this Article, but a few basic points may be sketched. The ap-
proach to intentional discrimination on the basis of religion or race
should not be that invalidity requires that "there was no question that
the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious [or racial] con-
siderations" 72 of the kind prohibited by the Constitution. Such gov-
ernment action, "to avoid suspicion, must have more than a mere
rational relationship to some valid nonreligious [or nonracial] pur-
pose";73 it should be more than "minimally related to the promotion"
of some permissible objective. 74 That standard would automatically
immunize virtually all regulations that threaten racial or religious lib-
erty in the most objectionable way. If the Court has good reason to
believe-and it may be that there is no "better" way to describe the
"test" which, as we have seen, is usually satisfied quite readily-that a
deliberate effort to harm persons or groups because of their race or
their religious beliefs has played a material role in the decisionmaking
process-especially if the Court's judgment is informed by general so-
cietal perception-then certain procedural rules should come into
play. For example, in order to dispel the inference of illicit motiva-
tion, I would favor placing the burden on the state to show that it has
no alternative means to achieve its permissible objective "that is both
less drastic in terms of effects adverse to the [nondiscrimination princi-
ple] and not beyond the state's capacity to implement."75 By stipulat-
ing that an improper purpose need be only a material (or substantial)
rather than the predominant (or primary) factor in order to trigger
special attention and by assigning the burden of justification to those
defending the government action, this procedure seeks to uncover
concealed animosity toward racial and religious groups while also al-
lowing the state the opportunity to accomplish any lawful goal that it
may have.
B. Intentional Advantage
1. Favoring Majorities
a. Differences between race and religion
Deliberately benefiting the racial majority concomitantly
prejudices racial minorities. It therefore falls within the preceding
72 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (emphasis added).
73 Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41
STAN. L. REv. 233, 329 (1989).
74 Brest, supra note 70, at 122.
75 Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's
Approach, 72 CoRNELL L. Rrv. 905, 923 (1987).
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analysis and plainly violates existing constitutional principles as well as
moral norms. In contrast, intentionally supporting mainstream reli-
gions76 has not unfailingly been held to be invalid.77 Thisjudicial pos-
ture reflects the value judgment that it is worthwhile for government to
acknowledge the feelings of members of religious faiths about "their
most central values and concerns" by responding to their wishes not to
be "excluded from a public culture devoted purely to secular con-
cerns." 78 In my view, these "accommodations" should survive constitu-
tional attack if they do not pose a meaningful threat to religious
liberty.79 While intentionally disadvantaging individuals because of
their religion is the constitutional and moral equivalent of invidiously
discriminating against people because of their race, our historic tradi-
tions and contemporary experience indicate that there are significant
differences between race and religion when deliberate advantage is at
issue. These distinctions are sufficient to warrant contrasting constitu-
tional treatment.
Government action that purposefully confers a benefit on
whites-for example, exempting them from a rule against serving alco-
holic beverages to minors, or making public property available to cele-
brate the Confederacy-ordinarily treats nonwhites with a tangible
disrespect by denying a meaningful privilege. Alternatively, such ac-
76 Among the more than one thousand different religions in the United States, I in-
clude in the term "mainstream" those defined by a recent study as "Protestantism as it finds
expression among the Baptists, the Methodists, the Episcopalians, the Presbyterians, the
Congregationalists, the Disciples of Christ and the Lutherans, as well as the other two 'great
faiths,' 'Catholicism and Judaism.' " I contrast these with "groups that have been called
'marginal' or 'non-normative' or 'cults' in their history, such as Mormons and Christian
Scientists, Spiritualists and Theosophists, followers of Meher Baba or the Reverend Sun
Myung Moon, practitioners of Hare Krishna, feminist witchcraft, or Zen." MARY BEDNAROW-
SKi, AMERICAN RFLIGION: A CULTURAL PERSPEcrIVE 2-3 (1984). The "mainstream" has been
described more succinctly as "the dominant, culturally established faiths held by the major-
ity of Americans." WADE ROOF & WILLIAM McKNNEV, AMERICAN MAINLINE RELIGION: ITS
CHANGING SHAPE AND FUrRE. 6 (1987).
77 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding holiday
display of Chanukah menorah and Christmas tree outside city-county building); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding city's inclusion of creche in annual large Christ-
mas display in private park).
78 Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the "No Endorsement" Test 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 311 (1987). Some commentators ob-
served that
[Tihe Founders affirmed the importance of religion to the new republic and
would have rejected the use of the establishment clause to eradicate the
religious leaven from public life. Instead, while recognizing the historical
dangers posed by religious establishments, they would agree that govern-
ment may acknowledge the crucial importance of religion to many citizens.
Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1559, 1616 (1989).
79 SeeJesse H. Choper, Church, State and The Supreme Court: Current Controversy, 29 Amiz.
L. REv. 551,553-57 (1987);Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Recon-
riling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1980) [hereinafter, Choper, Reconciling the Conflict].
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dons convey a message of racial insensitivity that is usually not present
when analogous action benefits mainstream religions. While I agree
that "[a] favorable statement about one class is not necessarily a correl-
ative pejorative remark about another class,"80 that is not true in the
racial examples just given.
On the other hand, although I concede that "[w]hen government
displays the symbols of the dominant religion-as when government
displays the symbols of white supremacy-the pain is not distributed
evenly,"8' I do not believe that the message sent to religious minorities
in the former situation is in any meaningful way as hurtful and offen-
sive as it is to racial minorities in the latter. This is probably true in
part because the substantive precepts of both mainstream and minority
faiths (such as the golden rule or most of the Ten Commandments)
are often perceived as containing special value for the welfare of soci-
ety. As a consequence, it is possible that favor or support for some
religions may be viewed as public appreciation for certain appealing
beliefs or for various wholesome activities rather than as an indirect
expression of disrespect toward other, "non-preferred" religions. The
overtones of racial prejudice and intolerance historically associated
with messages of white supremacy, for example, are simply not pres-
ent. Thus, favoring the dominant racial group realistically imposes the
same constitutionally forbidden harm as deliberately disadvantaging
racial minorities, and should be almost always invalid. Assisting main-
stream religious groups, however, need not be forbidden, in myjudg-
ment, unless it adversely affects religious liberty. In contrast to our
national ideal that a person's race should be irrelevant to decisionmak-
ing by government officials and private citizens, our heritage has tradi-
tionally affirmed the unique contribution of religious institutions to
the pluralism of American society and has positively approved of the
flourishing of religious freedom.
b. Judicial scrutiny of the motives of lawmakers
Although intentional government favoring of religion does not
automatically produce a violation of the Religion Clauses under my
approach, it does remain a significant factor in determining constitu-
tionality. Therefore, like scrutiny of actions that deliberately disadvan-
tage racial or religious groups, this requires an assessment of legislative
purpose. There is an important distinction between a lawmaking body
intending to give an "advantage" to-or, in alphabetical order, to "ad-
vance," "aid," "assist," "benefit," "favor," "help," "sponsor," or "sup-
80 William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Juris-
prudence, 66 IND. LJ. 351, 365 (1991).
81 Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Govern-
ment, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503, 511 (1992).
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port"-a religious cause, and state action that is concededly taken to
further legitimate public welfare ends but is in some part traceable to
the religious affiliation, ideals, ideologies or values of members of the
legislature.8 2 It is the deliberate conferral of an advantage of the first
kind that is the subject of discussion here and that calls for examina-
tion of lawmakers' motivations in an effort to ascertain what they really
hoped to accomplish through the operation of their enactment. Be-
cause action of the first kind is more constitutionally vulnerable than
action of the second kind83 (or than action undertaken for truly mixed
motives),84 lawmakers may be encouraged to cloak their real design,
thus increasing the need for judicial standards that can readily identify
the legislators' true intentions.
Fortunately, this incentive to conceal actual motivations is not as
great as it is in the context of purposefully disadvantaging racial or reli-
gious interests-probably because deliberately favoring mainstream
religious groups is not seen as being as hostile to deeply held national
values as are conscious attempts to prejudice persons because of their
race or their religious beliefs. Therefore, most legal enactments that
favor religion do so plainly by their terms-for example, a statutory
military draft exemption for religious objectors or a city's display of a
Latin cross on public property-and pose no problems of going be-
hind the letter of the law to discover purpose.
Admittedly, some government efforts to favor religion are more
subtle (or even hidden) and either make no mention of religion or
characterize as nonsectarian an activity that is generally understood as
having only a religious basis.8 5 Still, in such cases, discerning legisla-
tive intent readily falls within judicial capacity: the suspicious appear-
ance of these programs will ordinarily be quite clear even if disguised
in the garb of secular public welfare. Indeed, when discussing the rela-
tive ease of discerning motivation in the intentional prejudice category
above,8 6 almost all of the illustrations from the religious area, in con-
trast to race, grew out of government attempts to favor religion-pub-
lic school activities like Bible reading, prayer, teaching evolution and
creation science and posting the Ten Commandments in classrooms.
Additionly, several cases concerning government programs that offi-
cially acknowledge religion-legislative prayers by chaplains, and the
82 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
84 This third category covers situations in which many lawmakers wish to accomplish
either both ends, or one of the two ends. Regulations prohibiting abortion and providing
aid to parochial schools strike me as especially good examples.
85 Assume that the school board of an overwhelmingly Catholic community explained
its requirement that the catechism be taught to all first graders in the public schools as a
technique to develop memory skills.
86 See supra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
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display of creches and menorahs on public property-present activities
that may be readily categorized as purposefully meant to favor religion.
Occasional protestations by some justices to the contrary notwithstand-
ing,8 7 the straightforward assessment of most members of the Court
comports with the general public perception. As under the inten-
tional prejudice category, this assessment makes the delicate inquiry
into what the lawmaking body really hoped to accomplish a managea-
ble task.
2. Favoring Minorities: Differences Between Race and Religion
The constitutional implications are generally similar for govern-
ment action that intentionally favors a minority racial or religious group
and government action that grants deliberate advantage to the majority.
Affording a preference to a minority religious group is much more
likely to be upheld than intentionally granting an advantage to a mi-
nority racial group.
Although not adherents of the neutrality approach,88 traditional
liberal church-state separationists like Justice Brennan,8 9 advocates of
the endorsement approach to interpreting the Religion Clauses devel-
oped by Justice O'Connor,90 and conventional deferential conserva-
tives like Justice Scalia 91 would all sustain state action that grants
special consideration to adherents of minority religions by excusing
them from generally applicable government regulations that burden
them because of the tenets of their faith. Most church-state theorists
conclude that no special constitutional scrutiny is ordinarily required
in such instances, although they usually feel obliged to explain their
reasoning as to why extending this special protection for religious ex-
ercise does not conflict with the Establishment Clause. My own view is
somewhat different: government preferences for both minority and
mainstream religions should be treated in the same way in that both
87 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616-21, (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
announcingjudgment of the Court) (display of Christmas tree and menorah "simply recog-
nizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season");
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984) (creche has "legitimate secular purposes"
and "depicts the historical origins" of Christmas); id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(crhche has "legitimate secular purpose" and "celebrat[es] ... the public holiday through its
traditional symbols").
88 See Choper, Reconciling the Conflict, supra note 79, at 688 (noting that the neutrality
approach, articulated most fully by Professor Kurland, has never been embraced by any
member of the Court).
89 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
90 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (concur-
ring opinion).
91 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29-33 (1989) (dissenting
opinion).
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should be invalid when they pose a meaningful threat to religious
freedom.92
There is much greater disagreement among scholars and judges
(and among elected officials and the citizenry at large) about whether
government may grant some form of preference to minority racial
groups. Much of this dispute stems from the different contexts in
which government attempts to assist religious or racial minorities. In-
tentionally conferred religious benefits ordinarily take the form of ex-
emptions from generally applicable regulations, usually for very small
numbers of people. These immunities seem relatively benign, and
often desirable, because they are granted to make it easier for people
to adhere to the dictates of their faiths and are thereby seen as promot-
ing religious liberty. Programs that intentionally benefit racial minori-
ties, in contrast, usually impose broader structural changes with
respect to government benefits such as employment and education,
"characteristically occur[ring] in circumstances in which the use of race
to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of
a member of a different race."93
These race-conscious plans have been grounded in several ratio-
nales which lend support to different types of programs. The most
widely-indeed, near universally-accepted justification for a govern-
ment entity's use of a racial classification is as a remedy for its own past
racial discrimination against the persons or group that is now being
benefitted.94 Another goal that has been frequently advanced as justi-
fying affirmative action programs is obtaining the benefits that flow
from racial diversity.95 This purpose is particularly relevant in the edu-
cational setting, where it has been urged that people from a variety of
ethnic, geographic and economic backgrounds will contribute to the
exchange of a broader range of ideas in the classroom.9 6 This dia-
logue, it is argued, will enrich the education of the entire student body
and "better equip .. . graduates to render with understanding their
vital service to humanity."97 Probably the most controversial argument
92 Sce id.
93 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2846 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
94 City of Richmond v.J-. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In fact, this type of action
has been characterized by one of the Court's most vocal opponents of racial preferences as
"race-neutral remediation"-that is, as nothing more than a "preference to identified vic-
tims of discrimination" regardless of their race. Id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring). SeeJesse
H. Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial Classifications:
Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IowA L. REv. 255, 263 (1987).
95 Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (plurality opinion of
Powell, J.).
96 Id. at 312-13 n.48.
97 Id. at 314.
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for the legitimacy of preferential treatment of minorities9s is that this
is needed to counter the effects of societal discrimination, both histori-
cal and ongoing.99 A variety of defenses has been offered for this posi-
tion. One is the view that unequal distributions of economic resources
and opportunities, or de facto exclusion of racial minorities from
meaningful participation in the political process are as harmful, and as
offensive to the Equal Protection Clause, as de jure discrimination. 100
Increasing opportunities and representation of minorities offset these
effects by producing various "tangible and fully justified future bene-
fits."'' t Among these are the emergence of "role models"-examples
of success that other members of the minority group will emulate in
the future. 10 2
Proponents of affirmative action programs contend that it is con-
stitutionally permissible to disadvantage members of the racial major-
ity in order to further these goals. First, because these race-based
remedies serve "benign" government purposes and because whites do
not have the traditional indicia of suspectness, disadvantaged members
of the racial majority cannot experience the stigmatic harm that mi-
norities have experienced.103 Second, the means and ends of such
programs will remain "benign" over time because the racial majority is
unlikely to disadvantage itself due to prejudice or to underestimate its
own needs. 10 4 Finally, because subtle forms of de jure discrimination
against racial minorities presently exist anyway, it is unrealistic to use
the Equal Protection Clause's ideal of "colorblindness" to prohibit
race-based policies that seek to make minority groups whole. 10 5
From the other side of the spectrum, many persons find govern-
mentally conferred preferences for racial minorities to be trouble-
98 A more extreme, but not seriously debated, ground in favor of special benefits to
racial minorities is compensating them for past discrimination. Bakk 438 U.S. at 306 n.43;
see BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973). Underlying this purpose is a
recognition that prior dejure discrimination leaves minorities underrepresented in various
walks of life even after the discrimination has ended and that long-term underrepresenta-
tion stigmatizes minority groups.
99 A majority of the Court has rejected this as a constitutionally adequate justification
for a racial classification. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98 (1989).
100 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470, 487-88 (1976) ("Providing unequal and inad-
equate school resources and excluding black parents from meaningful participation in
school policymaking are at least as damaging to black children as enforced separation.").
101 Croson, 488 U.S. at 511 n.1 (Stevens,J., concurring).
102 Martin H. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An
Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. Ruv. 343, 391 (1974).
103 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting).
104 John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. R v.
723, 735 (1974).
105 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting).
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some, particularly because for every person of one racial group who
benefits, someone of another racial group is deprived. The four mem-
bers of the Court who joined justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,106 involving a federal policy granting racial
minorities a preference in ownership of radio and television licenses,
articulated this concern as follows:
"Benign racial classification" is a contradiction in terms. Govern-
mental distinctions among citizens based on race or ethnicity...
exact costs and carry with them substantial dangers. To the person
denied an opportunity or right based on race, the classification is
hardly benign. The right to equal protection of the laws is a per-
sonal right, securing to each individual an immunity from treatment
predicated simply on membership in a particular racial or ethnic
group.'0 7
Similarly, Justice Scalia has taken the position that special govern-
ment exceptions for religious minorities are readily permitted, 08 but
in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,' 09 involving a preference for mi-
nority businesses in securing city construction contracts, he wrote that
a racial quota "derogates the human dignity and individuality of all to
whom it is applied.... Moreover, it can easily be turned against those
it purports to help."" 0 He argued further that "even 'benign' racial
quotas have individual victims, whose very real injustice we ignore
whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be disadvan-
taged on the basis of race.""'
Finally, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Metro Broadcasting contended
that granting advantages to racial minorities may actually stigmatize
the present members of the majority racial group by implying that they
are responsible for the past discrimination that prompted the affirma-
tive action programs." 2 Moreover, these policies may also disparage
the beneficiaries by suggesting that they are "inherently less able to
compete on their own.""13
Thus, some observers view government preferences for racial mi-
norities as conveying the same constitutionally impermissible message
of disrespect to the racial majority as invidious government discrimina-
tion against minorities conveys to the members of minority groups. As
106 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
107 Id. at 609 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Scalia and Ken-
nedy, J.) (citation omitted).
108 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990);
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
110 Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE MORA=IT OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
111 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
112 497 U.S. at 637 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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a consequence of this division of opinion, the appropriate level of scru-
tiny for a minority racial preference is much less clear than for a reli-
gious exemption from generally applicable government rules. Some
members of the Court suggest that racially-based affirmative action
programs should be subject to the same strict scrutiny applied to any
other racial classification.' 1 4 Others contend that they should be sub-
ject to the "intermediate level" scrutiny applied to gender-based classi-
fications.'1 5 All members of the Court agree, however, that some form
of heightened scrutiny is appropriate, in marked contrast to their ap-
proach to preferences for minority religious faiths.
II
EFFECT
A. Burdensome Impact: Differences Between Race and Religion
Actions intended to disadvantage either a racial or a religious
group are both properly subject to a rule of almost per se invalidity.
But despite the fact that the Court subjects "to the most exacting scru-
tiny laws that make classifications based on race,"" 6 it has expressly
declined" 7 to give any but the most deferential review to "race-neutral
laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particu-
lar racial group."" 8 Whether or not this interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause is correct,119 there is a stronger argument, in my
view, for finding that "generally applicable religion-neutral laws that
have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice" 120 are
more threatening to constitutional values' 2 ' than government action
that has a disproportionate impact on minority racial groups.
A core value of the Equal Protection Clause is to forbid people
from being prejudiced because of their race. Race-neutral laws that
have a disproportionate impact on minority racial groups do not in-
jure members of those groups because of their race, but because the
minority group members are disproportionately represented in the
larger group affected (often the poor, or the poorly educated), all of
whom are suffering disadvantage. 122 Not all people who suffer the spe-
114 Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
115 Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
116 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
117 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that in cases of alleged racial
discrimination, strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is triggered only if it is
shown that the government intends to treat racial groups differently).
118 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
119 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
120 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
121 For further development, see Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitu-
tional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REv. 651 (1991).
122 Admittedly, there may be exceptional situations in which minority group members
suffer unique injury because of their race from the effect of laws that are race-neutral by
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cial operative consequences of the government action are members of
the racial group and not all members of the racial group suffer the
operative consequences.
A core value of the Religion Clauses is to forbid people from be-
ing prejudiced because of their religion. This parallels the prohibition
of the Equal Protection Clause as to race. However, since religion not
only confers a status but also imposes an often multi-faceted belief sys-
tem on its adherents, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of bur-
dening a particular religious practice do injure persons because of their
religion. Even though these laws have a fully legitimate public purpose
and achieve beneficial results generally, all persons who suffer the spe-
cial operative consequences adverse to their belief system are necessar-
ily members of that religion and all members of that religion suffer the
special operative adverse consequences. As a result of this unique ef-
fect on religion, laws that unintentionally burden the exercise of reli-
gion are more analogous to laws that deliberately disadvantage racial
or religious groups than they are to laws that inadvertently impose dis-
proportionate disadvantage on minority racial groups.123 This similar-
ity between burdensome effect on religion and the type of de jure
discrimination that is most offensive to the Constitution justifies
heightened judicial scrutiny of the impact of such laws under the Reli-
gion Clauses, although such effects might not be reviewed so carefully
under the Equal Protection Clause.
There is an additional reason, grounded in weighty practical con-
siderations, for a constitutional rule that is more protective of religion
than race against neutral laws that have disproportionate impacts.
While the traditional relief from regulations that intentionally preju-
dice racial or religious groups is to completely strike down that part of
the law imposing the disadvantage, the usual remedy where a law inad-
their terms and intent. See Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAi. L. Rrv. 275, 298-307 (1972). There is a good argument that
the Court should apply some form of heightened scrutiny here as well as in respect to the
analogous situation with minority religions.
123 The paradigmatic instance of deliberately disadvantaging a racial group is govern-
ment action that by definition prejudices all members of a racial minority and only such
persons: for example, a law that excludes all blacks from serving on juries. There are also
instances of laws that intentionally disadvantage a minority group but that do not necessar-
ily affect all members of the group. For example, a law forbidding all blacks without high
school diplomas from serving on juries intentionally disadvantages blacks, and thereby is as
offensive to the Constitution as a law forbidding all blacks from serving, even though it does
not affect all blacks. These types of laws demonstrate some of the subtlety involved in defin-
ing discrimination and refute the proposition that all intentional discrimination necessarily
affects all members of the group subject to disadvantage. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1984) (denial of disability benefits for pregnancy and childbirth does not discriminate
against women). Nevertheless, the paradigm case best illustrates both the fundamental evil
of intentional discrimination-prejudicing minorities because of their minority status-and
why laws that unintentionally burden religious minorities exhibit a similar evil.
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vertently burdens minority religious groups is simply to grant an ex-
emption. Therefore, protecting against burdensome effects on
religion will usually result only in limiting the reach of government
action in discrete instances. Protecting against burdensome effects on
race, in contrast, would have much broader consequences. In holding
that an equal protection challenge fails if a law with a racially discrimi-
natory effect has "some rational basis,"124 the Court was significantly
influenced by the recognition that a more restrictive rule would realis-
tically eliminate or severely disrupt many important longstanding and
widely supported arrangements such as, "tests and qualifications for
voting, draft deferment, public employment, jury service, and other
government-conferred benefits and opportunities . . . ; [s]ales taxes,
bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, and other state-
imposed charges."125 It would hardly be feasible to excuse all mem-
bers of racial minority groups from the obligations of these programs.
But granting a religious exemption in response to a successful free ex-
ercise challenge in this context ordinarily carries only a modest socie-
tal impact and has proven to be a traditionally accepted and workable
remedy.
B. Beneficial Impact: Differences Between Race and Religion
State programs that inadvertently disfavor minority racial groups
have been the subject of substantial constitutional challenge.' 26 How-
ever, judges and scholars have not seriously questioned the validity of
government action that has unintended beneficial effects for the racial
majoity-an example might be agricultural price supports. The likely
reason for this disparity is that adventitious favoring of the dominant
racial group does not carry with it an associated message of disrespect
for those racial groups that are not so advantaged. It follows as a mat-
ter of both logic and policy that government action that inadvertently
favors a minority racial group-an example might be Aid to Families
with Dependent Children-presently stirs no constitutional debate.
Some proposals for interpreting the Religion Clauses similarly ig-
nore the beneficial effects of government action. For example, under
the neutrality approach,' 27 as long as the state regulation does not
draw a religious classification, the fact that it favorably affects religious
interests within a sufficiently larger category is irrelevant to its constitu-
124 Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-48.
125 Id. at 248 n.14 (quoting Goodman, supra note 122, at 300).
126 See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Scholarly commentary is
extensive. See, e.g., TheodoreJ. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and illicit Motive: Theories of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); MichaelJ. Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977).
127 See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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tionality. Most significant efforts to develop legal doctrines for the res-
olution of disputes under the Religion Clauses, however, attribute
substantial importance to impact. Thus, a major element of the
Supreme Court's LemonA1 28 test, the governing approach to judging Es-
tablishment Clause issues since the early 1970s, is that a law's "princi-
pal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.' 29 Injustice O'Connor's development of the endorsement
approach, she also emphasized the effect of government action by
making the perception of a reasonable or objective observer determina-
tive.' 30  Finally, Justice Kennedy's "coercion" approach-originally
constructed as an alternative to both the Lemon test and the endorse-
ment proposal' 3 ' and, in my view, the governing standard on the
Supreme Court for Establishment Clause questions during the 1992-
1993 Term' 32-looks almost exclusively to the way that the challenged
regulation operates.' 33
Under my approach, the Religion Clauses' dominant concern of
protecting religious liberty should extend to government action that
has the inadvertent effect of benefiting religion. At the outset, it
should be noted that apart from some deliberate efforts by govern-
ment to favor sectarian interests, there are virtually no laws whose only
effect is to aid religion; practically every government rule can reason-
ably be found to ultimately influence some public welfare end. A
number of such regulations, however, accomplish the secular goal only
as a consequence of the prior achievement of a religious purpose. To
put it another way: the secular effect is not independent; rather, it
depends on (or derives from) the initial completion of the religious
aim. These laws, in Madison's words, "employ Religion as an engine of
Civil policy."134 To immunize them because of their public welfare
benefits would, I believe, effectively read much of the core of the Es-
tablishment Clause out of the First Amendment. 35 For example, it
128 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129 Id. at 612. The Court's earlier "test" also required that a law's "primary effect" may
not be either "the advancement or inhibition of religion." School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
130 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625-26 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'ConnorJ., concurring); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131 See Jesse H. Choper, Separation of Church and State: "New" Directions by the "New"
Supreme Court, 34J. CHURCH & ST. 363, 364-65 (1992).
132 See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649;Jesse H. Choper, Benchmarks, 79 A.B.A.J. 78, 80
(1993).
133 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
134 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, sec.
5 (1786), quoted in Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1, 67 (app.) (1947).
135 See Choper, supra note 13, at 607 n.142.
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would justify state subsidization of that church which the government
found best inculcates its members with the deep convictions that make
for better citizenship. Accordingly, in my view, government action-
regardless of its purpose or general applicability-that benefits reli-
gious interests and has no independent secular impact'3 6 should vio-
late the Establishment Clause if the action poses a meaningful danger
to religious liberty. This principle should apply if the law aids any reli-
gion-mainstream or minority.
Because government expenditures that eventually provide a finan-
cial advantage to church-related institutions probably comprise the
largest category of state programs that have the unplanned effect of
aiding religion, it is appropriate to conclude this discussion by explain-
ing why these public appropriations may pose a threat to the religious
freedom of individuals and groups. In the judgment of many, "[t] he
most serious infringement upon religious liberty"1 37 is posed "by forc-
ing [citizens] to pay taxes in support of a religious establishment or
religious activities.'u38 This is cogently confirmed by Thomas Jeffer-
son's "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty"'3 9 which proclaimed "that to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical";140 by James
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments,' 41 which condemned even forcing "a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property" to support any religious establish-
ment;142 by Thomas Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,143 which found
clearly unlawful "under any of the American constitutions . . .
[c]ompulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious instruc-
136 For amplification, see Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 CAL. L. REv. 260, 279 (1968).
137 Leo Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in Church and State, 13 W. RES. L. REv. 9, 18 (1961).
SeeFlastv. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (dissenting
opinion by Frankel, J.). Judge Frankel noted that "[iJt is now familiar to all who have
touched this subject that a central concern-perhaps the most central concern-of the
Establishment Clause is to ban utterly the use of public moneys to support any religion or
all religions." Id. at 6. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELI-
GION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); Adams & Emmerich, supra note 78, at 1620-21.
138 Paul G. Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REv. 3, 9
(1961).
139 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823). But cf MARK D. HowE, THE GARDEN AND
THE WILDERNESS; RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 26
(1965).
140 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823).
141 MADISON, supra note 134, quoted in Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 65-66 (app.). See also Rast,
271 F. Supp. at 6-7 (dissenting opinion of Frankel, J.) (" 'Support' by use of taxpayers'
money lay at the heart ofJefferson's and Madison's concern."); Leo Pfeffer, FederalFundsfor
Parochial Schools? No, 37 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 309, 310-11 (1962).
142 Id.
143 THOMAS M. CooLEy, 2 A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 966-67 (8th
ed. 1927).
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tion";'4 and by many important Supreme Court opinions.145 Indeed,
one need look no further than the Court's first major interpretation of
the Establishment Clause in which the justices, unanimously emphasiz-
ing the "conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved
best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions,"'1 46 reasoned that the
First Amendment means at least that "[n] o tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion."147
While public subsidy of religion may not directly influence peo-
ple's beliefs or practices, it plainly coerces taxpayers either to contrib-
ute indirectly to their religions or, even worse, to support sectarian
doctrines and causes that are antithetical to their own convictions. As
a matter of both historical design and present constitutional policy,
the Religion Clauses-particularly the Establishment Clause-should
be interpreted to forbid so basic an infringement of religious lib-
erty.148 Where such a meaningful threat to freedom exists and there is
no independent secular impact, the government action should be inva-
lid under the Establishment Clause.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Engel; 370 U.S. at 442 n.7 (Douglas, J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 452-53 (1961); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 248-49 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting); Everson, 330 U.S. at 8, 10-12; id. at 33, 41, 44, 52-53 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); see also Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 48-49 (1815).
146 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
147 Id. at 15.
148 The existence of an individual right not to have one's compulsorily raised tax funds
spent for religious purposes explains the Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968), granting federal taxpayers standing to challenge federal expenditures allegedly in
violation of the Religion Clauses. As the Court put it:
Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those
who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that
the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over
another or to support religion in general.... The concern of Madison and
his supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the
victim.
Id. at 103. See also id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Because ... [the Establishment
Clause] plainly prohibits taxing and spending in aid of religion, every taxpayer can claim a
personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious institution.").
Finally, Justice Harlan's dissent, acknowledged the essence of the Court's reasoning "that a
taxpayer's claim under the Establishment Clause is 'not merely one of ultra vires,' but one
which instead asserts 'an abridgment of individual religious liberty' and a 'governmental
infringement of individual rights protected by the Constitution.'" Id. at 125 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Choper, supra note 136, at 276).
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